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Abstract
This article traces a genealogy of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections
and Governance (ACDEG) and examines the charter’s overall implementation.
While there has always been a struggle between competing views of how to ensure
more or less continental accountability for norms related to democratic governance
in Africa, enforcement by the African Union (AU) has definitively become
more robust since the ACDEG’s adoption. The article argues that this development
is observable in three trends: continental legalization, technocratization and judicia-
lization of politics. It evaluates the growth of normative commitments in the field of
democracy, elections and governance and their increasing consolidation into bind-
ing legal treaties; explores the increasing reliance on AU technical assistance in
the implementation and interpretation of these instruments; and assesses the
expanding role of continental and regional judicial bodies in enforcing commitments
to democracy. Building upon a better understanding of these trends, the article
identifies key contextual factors that will shape the ACDEG’s future implementation.
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INTRODUCTION
Contrary to customarily bleak accounts, Africa has undergone significant
changes that have resulted in improvements in its governance landscape
over the past decade.1 Yet, the continent is also still marked by civil wars
(for example in South Sudan and Libya), coups d’état (for example in Egypt
and Zimbabwe), serious human rights violations (for example in Sudan and
Eritrea) and election related violence (for example in Kenya and Democratic
Republic of the Congo). The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and
Governance (ACDEG) is a unique instrument, aimed at addressing these chal-
lenges so as to, in the words of its preamble, “deepen and consolidate the rule
of law, peace, security and development”.
Having initially envisaged a declaration,2 the African Union (AU)
Commission persuaded the Executive Council to authorize the development
of a legally binding treaty based on the collective commitments already
made by AU member states in the domains of elections, democracy and gov-
ernance.3 The AU Commission’s arguments were based on a consolidation
logic and a declaration fatigue. Invoking the advantage of bringing all these
commitments together in one text,4 as well as considering “that the
Organization had already adopted many Declarations and Decisions on
the same issue”, the AU Commission recommended “a more binding text in
the form of a Charter rather than yet another declaration”.5
Since its adoption in 2007 and subsequent entry into force in 2012, the
ACDEG has generated considerable interest from scholars and practitioners.6
1 “African governance remains on a moderate upward trajectory”: 2018 Ibrahim Index of
African Governance Report (2018, Mo Ibrahim Foundation) at 17.
2 Draft AU Declaration on Elections, Democracy and Governance (20 February 2003) (copy
on file with the authors).
3 Decision of the Meeting of Experts on Elections, Democracy and Governance in Africa
(2004), EX.CL/Dec. 124(V).
4 Report of the Interim Chairperson on the Proceedings of the African Conference on Elections,
Democracy and Good Governance (2003), EX.CL/35(III) at 12 (copy on file with the authors).
5 Report on the Meeting of Government Experts on the Documents from the Pretoria Conference on
Elections, Democracy and Governance (2004), EX.CL/91(V), annex IV at 1 (copy on file with
the authors).
6 See, for example, ER McMahon The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance:
A Positive Step on a Long Path (2007, Open Society Institute); K Matlosa “The African Charter
on Democracy, Elections and Governance: Declaration vs policy practice” (2008) 53 Centre
for Policy Studies Policy Brief 1; PJ Glen “Institutionalizing democracy in Africa: A comment
on the African Charter for Democracy, Elections and Governance” (2012) 5 African Journal
of Legal Studies 119.
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Although scholars largely agreed on the ACDEG’s potential, many were scep-
tical about its implementation and anticipated effects.7 Academic literature
in the fields of both law and political science has increasingly paid attention
to the ACDEG’s role in dealing with “unconstitutional changes of govern-
ments”8 and in particular military coups d’état.9 There is also a growing schol-
arly interest in the role of the AU in addressing serious democratic governance
challenges related to popular uprisings10 and the manipulation of presidential
term limits.11 Yet, there is a dearth of literature that considers the implemen-
tation of the ACDEG in a broader, holistic sense.
This article does so by examining the implementation of the ACDEG in light
of its contested background, the broader continental governance trends of
which it is part and the factors that may undermine or contribute to its future
success. The first section sets out a historical account that traces the genealogy
of different sets of ideas within the AU, which broadly fall within the ACDEG’s
mandate of supporting and defending democracy, elections and good govern-
ance. This part of the article focuses on the main rationales, struggles and core
tensions underpinning the different continental agendas in the field of demo-
cratic governance, with the aim of identifying the assumptions and worldview
on which the ACDEG is based. The next section examines the ACDEG’s impact
over the past decade since its adoption, including the various legal and insti-
tutional initiatives to which it has given rise and its operationalization in
different policy domains. Here, the article considers how three concurrent
7 See, for example, I Kane “The implementation of the African Charter on Democracy,
Elections and Governance” (2008) 17/4 African Security Review 43; ST Ebobrah The
African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance: A New Dawn for the Enthronement
of Legitimate Governance in Africa? (2007, Open Society Institute); S Saungweme A Critical
Look at the Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance in Africa (2007, Open Society
Institute); SA Elvy “Towards a new democratic Africa: The African Charter on
Democracy, Elections and Governance” (2013) 27/1 Emory International Law Review 41.
8 See, for example, TK Tieku “Multilateralization of democracy promotion and defense in
Africa” (2009) 56/2 Africa Today 75; M Ndulo “The prohibition of unconstitutional change
of government” in AA Yusuf and F Ouguergouz (eds) The African Union: Legal and
Institutional Framework: A Manual on the Pan-African Organization (2012, Martinus
Nijhoff) 251; S Vandeginste “The African Union, constitutionalism and power sharing”
(2013) 57/1 Journal of African Law 1; M Wiebusch The Role of Regional Organizations in
the Protection of Constitutionalism (2016, International Institute for Democracy and
Electoral Assistance).
9 Y Omorogbe “A club of incumbents? The African Union and coups d’état” (2011) 44/123
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 123; I Souaré “The African Union as a norm entre-
preneur on military coups d’état in Africa (1952–2012): An empirical assessment” (2014)
52/1 Journal of Modern African Studies 69.
10 See SA Dersso “The status and legitimacy of popular uprisings in the AU norms on dem-
ocracy and constitutional governance” and P Manirakiza “Towards a right to resist gross
undemocratic practices in Africa”, both in this issue.
11 See M Wiebusch and C Murray “Presidential term limits and the African Union” in this
issue.
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trends of continental governance (legalization, technocratization and judicia-
lization of continental politics) have been evident in, and influenced the
implementation of, the charter. The final section considers the ACDEG’s pro-
spects based on a contextualized analysis. It highlights the challenges and
opportunities that are likely to have a bearing on the instrument’s future
interpretation and implementation.
Through this three step analysis, a story emerges that situates the ACDEG at
the very heart of developments in African governance. Its transformation from
a project to consolidate existing political commitments on democratic govern-
ance into a legally binding treaty has been followed by its implementation,
which has been frequently characterized by multiple practices and tensions
at the interface of law and politics. Developed with the aim of addressing pol-
itical (mal)practice through law, the ACDEG now forms a crucial yardstick for
holding states legally accountable for (dis)respecting norms on democracy and
good governance.
THE PAST: CONTESTATION AND CONSOLIDATION
The ACDEG was adopted at the eighth ordinary session of the AU Assembly of
Heads of State and Government (the Assembly), held in Addis Ababa in 2007,
and is open only for signature, ratification and accession by AU member
states. As has become fairly standard practice for AU treaties, the ACDEG
requires 15 signatures to enter into force. The 15th signature was deposited
in February 2012. Since then, 17 more states have ratified the ACDEG. As of
January 2019, it had been ratified by a total of 32 states and signed by 46 states.
Although the ACDEG has only been ratified by barely more than half of the
AU member states, it is still one of the most widely ratified and signed AU
treaties.12
As an exclusive AU instrument, the ACDEG forms part of broader policy
approaches and responses by the AU and its predecessor, the Organisation
of African Unity (OAU), in addressing issues of continental human rights pro-
tection, democratization, collective security, international development and
good governance programmes. It consists of 11 chapters, of which three are
operational (chapters 1, 10 and 11: definitions; mechanisms for application;
and final clauses) and eight are substantive (chapters 2–9: objectives; princi-
ples; democracy, rule of law and human rights; the culture of democracy
and peace; democratic institutions; democratic elections; sanctions in cases
of unconstitutional changes of government; and political, economic and
social governance). Throughout, the ACDEG establishes minimum continental
12 A list of the signature, ratification, accession and deposit status of all (O)AU treaties, con-
ventions, protocols and charters is available at: <https://au.int/en/treaties> (last accessed
9 January 2019).
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standards for ensuring, promoting and protecting democracy, the rule of law,
human rights, peace and socio-economic development.13
The main question underlying this specific legal and political project strikes
at the heart of the relationship between the continental organization and its
member states: should there be more or less continental influence and over-
sight of the way the domestic political and socio-economic order is organized?
In other words, should domestic governance arrangements be further
“Africanized”? The authors understand Africanization as a collective effort to
imagine and organize a political project based on a continentally defined iden-
tity. Specifically, it is the process through which the AU’s political arrange-
ments increasingly structure and become part of domestic policy making.
Conflicting perspectives on this issue are part and parcel of the organization’s
history, nature and purpose. They lay at the heart of the establishment of the
organization in the early 1960s,14 and remained present throughout its insti-
tutional development into the AU15 and the various attempts to reconfigure
the workings of the AU.16 The ACDEG can be described as yet another mani-
festation of the struggle between continuously evolving views of how to
ensure more or less continental accountability for certain commitments to
a particular socio-political order, namely, in this particular case, a liberal
democratic order.17
Against this background, the ACDEG is the outcome of an encounter of vari-
ous continental governmental agendas woven throughout the history of the
(O)AU. In each of these agendas, different struggles took place, based on com-
peting interests over the extent of continental norm setting and continental
accountability mechanisms. Norm setting refers to the scope of the commit-
ments made by member states aimed at improving governance in Africa,
while accountability mechanisms refer to the degree to which the AU may
enforce these commitments.
The following overview does not attempt to provide a complete history of
the various components that constitute the ACDEG. Instead it focuses on
those fields that have proven to be most influential in respect of how the char-
ter is operationalized today. Specifically, it considers those elements where the
13 See also ACDEG, art 52, which provides: “None of the provisions of the present Charter
shall affect more favourable provisions [contained] in national legislation [or other
applicable] regional, continental or international conventions.”
14 K vanWalraven Dreams of Power: The Role of the Organization of African Unity in the Politics of
Africa, 1963–1993 (1999, Ashgate).
15 TK Tieku “Explaining the clash and accommodation of interests of major actors in the
creation of the African Union” (2004) 103 African Affairs 249; M Welz Integrating Africa:
Decolonization’s Legacies, Sovereignty and the African Union (2012, Routledge).
16 D Lecoutre “Vers un gouvernement de l’Union Africaine? Maximalistes vs gradualistes”
[Towards an African Union government? Maximalistes v gradualists] (2007) 147 Institute
for Security Studies Paper 1; A Witt “The African Union and contested political order(s)” in
U Engel and J Gomes Porto (eds) Africa’s New Peace and Security Architecture: Continental
Embeddedness, Transnational Linkages, Strategic Relevance (2013, Ashgate) 11.
17 Elvy “Towards a new democratic Africa”, above at note 7.
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tension between competing visions of the degree of continental governance
was most visible. What it particularly aims to emphasize is that many ideas
and policy proposals on more robust norm setting and norm enforcement
in the domain of democratic governance already existed at the continental
level, but that they had been rejected in favour of a more cautious approach.
The article highlights that, despite earlier contestation, the continental regime
is returning to previously silenced ideas and is progressively moving towards
more comprehensive norms in the domain of democratic governance, and
stronger mechanisms to ensure their implementation and enforcement.
This trend can be observed in three specific policy domains: human rights,
elections and unconstitutional changes of government.
The OAU Charter of 1963, establishing the OAU, was markedly void of any
explicit references to political governance imperatives such as democracy, elec-
tions, rule of law and human rights. The OAU Charter did recognize in its pre-
amble that “freedom, equality, justice and dignity are essential objectives for
the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples”. Yet,
these principles were not explicitly made part of the OAU’s core mandate.
Instead, the emphasis on human rights was mostly peripheral to the organiza-
tion’s main agenda on decolonization, territorial integrity and economic
growth: overall, an agenda that focused more on states than individuals.18 It
was only towards the late 1970s that this preambular provision of the OAU
Charter was used as a normative basis to develop the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter).19
The African Charter recognizes a number of rights that later found their
way into the ACDEG. The right to participate in government20 is undoubtedly
of greatest relevance to the core ideas behind the ACDEG. The ACDEG to a large
extent can be described as an overall elaboration of this right by setting more
detailed conditions for its fulfilment. Other important rights that found their
way into the ACDEG include the rights to freedom from discrimination,21
equality before the law and equal protection of the law,22 freedom of expres-
sion,23 education,24 a satisfactory environment,25 and peace and security.26
While ideas were already circulating among non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), lawyers, judges and scholars from various African countries to
18 A Huneeus and M Madsen “Between universalism and regional law and politics: A com-
parative history of the American, European, and African human rights systems” (2018)
16/1 International Journal of Constitutional Law 136 at 149.
19 African Charter (1981), preamble.
20 Id, art 13.
21 African Charter, art 2. ACDEG, art 8.
22 African Charter, art 3. ACDEG, art 10(3).
23 African Charter, art 9. ACDEG, art 27(8).
24 African Charter, art 17. ACDEG, art 43.
25 African Charter, art 24. ACDEG, art 42.
26 African Charter, art 23. ACDEG, art 38.
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establish a judicial body to enforce human rights in the early 1960s,27 they
were rejected by the lead drafters during the preparation of the African
Charter in the late 1970s and early 1980s. A continental mechanism to ensure
accountability of member states’ human rights commitments was found “pre-
mature”,28 and instead a quasi-judicial institution, the African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), was established to promote and protect
human rights without the ability to make legally binding decisions.29 It would
take two more decades before the African Court on Human and Peoples’
Rights (ACtHPR) was established.30 However, the African Charter did establish
an important procedure that eventually shaped the accountability mechan-
isms embedded in the ACDEG. This is the state reporting mechanism coordi-
nated by the ACHPR, which imposes an obligation on states to submit
bi-annually an account of the various legislative and other measures taken
to give effect to the provisions of the African Charter.31 While continental
monitoring in the form of state reporting mechanisms had first been
established in 1968 with the African Convention on the Conservation of
Nature and Natural Resources,32 it was the reporting under the African
Charter that set the overall template for state reporting mechanisms in the
(O)AU context.33
How did the OAU then transform from an organization widely viewed as a
champion of sovereignty and non-interference, often to the detriment of
27 See International Commission of Jurists “Law of Lagos” (1961) 3/1 Journal of International
Commission of Jurists 9, para 4.
28 F Viljoen “The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The travaux préparatoires
in the light of subsequent practice” (2004) 24/9–12 Human Rights Law Journal 313 at 316.
29 For an account that argues that the ACHPR findings can be seen as legally binding, see
F Viljoen and L Louw “The status of the findings of the African Commission: From
moral persuasion to legal obligation” (2004) 48/1 Journal of African Law 1.
30 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of
the African Court (1998). See, for example, NJ Udombana “Toward the African Court on
Human and Peoples’ Rights: Better late than never” (2000) 3/1 Yale Human Rights and
Development Law Journal 45.
31 African Charter, art 62. ACDEG, art 49.
32 African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (1968, entered
into force in 1969), art 16. This convention was revised in 2003, but has not yet entered
into force. See art 29 for the reporting procedure.
33 Later state reporting mechanisms were included in other human rights instruments
and states are required to report to the ACHPR on those respective instruments as
part of the Banjul Charter reporting procedure. These instruments include the
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of
Women in Africa, the Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally
Displaced Persons in Africa and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Older Persons in Africa. Other legal instruments estab-
lished a separate entity to which state parties have to report: the African Committee of
Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child in respect of the African Charter on the
Rights andWelfare of the Child; the African Commission on Nuclear Energy in respect of
the African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty; and the AU Advisory Board on Corruption
in respect of the Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption.
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African citizens suffering from serious security, political and economic hard-
ships, to an organization that champions principles and ideas such as democ-
racy, the rule of law and human rights? For this transformation to take place a
change of worldview was needed. The first comprehensive statement of such a
changing worldview is found in the 1990 OAU Declaration on the Political and
Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking
Place in the World (Declaration on Fundamental Changes).34 A number of
important geo-political contextual changes prompted the adoption of this
declaration, including: the end of the Cold War; political changes in Central
and Eastern Europe possibly leading to greater “price competition between
Eastern Europe and Africa for access to Western markets”35 and economic,
technical and cultural assistance being diverted away from Africa to Eastern
Europe; political conditionality from donors, making the existence of multi-
party democracy a condition for aid; and a “global tendency towards regional
integration and the establishment of trading and economic blocks”,36 result-
ing in a “new international economic order that could further debilitate
and marginalize Africa”.37
The Declaration on Fundamental Changes and the ideas contained in it trig-
gered a diverse set of initiatives that in one way or another ended up being
codified in the ACDEG. First, it formalized a continental commitment to a lib-
eral agenda broadly associated with democracy, the rule of law and human
rights.38 This ideological commitment was reproduced in the founding treaty
of the AU as part of its core principles39 and later formed the normative basis
of the ACDEG.40 Secondly, it formally endorsed the OAU’s involvement in the
34 Declaration of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the Political and
Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the
World, AHG/Decl.1 (XXVI) (1990).
35 Report of the Secretary General on the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World and their
Implications for Africa: Proposals for an African Response (CM/1592) (1990), para 39 (copy on
file with the authors).
36 Declaration on Fundamental Changes, above at note 34, para 2.
37 Report of the Secretary General on the Fundamental Changes, above at note 35, para 58.
38 Declaration on Fundamental Changes, above at note 34, para 2: “We are fully aware that
in order to facilitate this process of socio-economic transformation and integration, it is
necessary to promote popular participation of our peoples in the processes of govern-
ment and development. A permitting political environment which guarantees human
rights and the observance of the rule of law, would ensure high standards of probity
and accountability, particularly on the part of those who hold public office. In addition,
popular-based political processes would ensure the involvement of all including in par-
ticular women and youth in the development efforts. We accordingly recommit our-
selves to the further democratization of our societies and to the consolidation of
democratic institutions in our countries.”
39 Constitutive Act of the AU (2000), preamble and art 4(m): “respect for democratic princi-
ples, human rights, the rule of law and good governance”.
40 ACDEG, preamble.
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process of democratization and consolidating democratic institutions.41 This
involvement was directed primarily towards electoral processes through elec-
tion observation. The OAU started its election observation practice in 1989
with a joint UN mission to observe the elections in Namibia. Its first independ-
ent mission took place in February 1990 when an OAU team consisting of
three members was invited to observe the presidential election in
Comoros.42 For the next ten years, the OAU organized several other missions
at the invitation of member states. But it did so without an explicit mandate.
Although there was an emerging “consensus among Member States in favour
of the OAU assuming a major role in the monitoring of elections, to date no
formal decision or resolutions has specified in clear and concise terms the
goal and objectives of such activities”.43 Therefore, the OAU commenced a pro-
cess to develop a legal mandate to observe elections, which ultimately led to
the 2002 (O)AU Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic
Elections in Africa. Again the tension between more and less continental
accountability became apparent. Some states argued for an AU mandate to
observe “all elections in Member States without invitation, but as [sic] manda-
tory responsibility”.44 Several other states opposed this idea, considering that
“issues of sovereignty and non-interference in internal matters might conflict
with such a proposal”,45 and insisted on prior invitation by states. This pos-
ition towards less robust continental accountability was also reflected in the
ACDEG, since the AU still needed an invitation to send an electoral observer
mission. At the same time however, the new wording in the ACDEG already
reflected a more progressive stance, since states now have a quasi-obligation
to send an invitation.46 Subsequent practice shows that the AU now also
sends missions when it has not received a formal invitation.47 One of the
key triggers of this change in approach was the absence of an invitation for
the AU to observe the Kenyan elections in 2007, which were marred by serious
post-electoral violence.48
The greater continental concern with the political system of AU member
states was complemented by an emerging consensus on the need to address
the challenge of coups d’état. While the 1990 Declaration on Fundamental
41 Report of the Secretary General on Strengthening the Role of the OAU / AU in Elections,
Observations and Monitoring and the Advancement of the Democratization Process in Africa,
CM/2257 (LXXVI) (2002) at 1 (copy on file with the authors).
42 Ibid.
43 Id at 8.
44 Report on the Meeting of Government Experts, above at note 5, annex A at 6.
45 Ibid.
46 ACDEG, art 19 stipulates: “Each State Party shall inform the Commission of scheduled
elections and invite it to send an electoral observer mission.” (emphasis added)
47 S Karume and E Mura “Reflections on African Union electoral assistance and observa-
tion” in R Cordenillo and A Ellis (eds) The Integrity of Elections: The Role of Regional
Organizations (2012, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance) 21
at 30.
48 Ibid.
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Changes paved the way for the OAU’s democratization agenda, it also provided
the impetus to strengthen the continent’s peace agenda. This was most obvi-
ous with the adoption of the 1993 Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of
State and Government on the Establishment within the OAU of a
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (Cairo
Declaration). This mechanism was built around the Central Organ, the fore-
runner of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), to “assume overall direc-
tion and co-ordinate the activities of the Mechanism”.49 Following the coup
d’état by mercenaries in Comoros in 1995, the Central Organ resolved to estab-
lish a sub-committee to develop a continental response to unconstitutional
changes of government.50 This agenda later formed a centre piece of the
ACDEG.51 However, the unconstitutional changes of government agenda can
trace its origins much further back. In fact, one of the key principles under-
lying the OAU’s purpose, as established in the 1963 OAU Charter, is the “[u]nre-
served condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassination as well as of
subversive activities on the part of neighbouring States or any other
States”.52 These concerns, prompted among other things, by the assassinations
of Congolese and Togolese independence leaders Patrice Lumumba (1961) and
Sylvanus Olympio (1963) respectively,53 were further addressed in the OAU
Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa (1977)
(Mercenarism Convention). The core objective of this instrument was to
address the grave threats to self-determination and development caused by
the activities of mercenaries,54 witnessed for instance in their use by the colo-
nial power Portugal against Guinea with the aim of “intimidating those States
which in the name of African solidarity … are giving material and moral sup-
port to the liberation movements”.55 The issue returned to the OAU’s agenda
in dealing with mercenary activities orchestrated by racist regimes in
Southern Africa (1979),56 as well as in condemning foreign mercenary involve-
ment in the failed coup in the Seychelles (1982)57 and later in Equatorial
Guinea (2004).58 The Mercenarism Convention eventually formed part of the
normative foundation for the (O)AU’s anti-unconstitutional change of govern-
ment agenda, which expressly bans “any intervention by mercenaries to
49 Cairo Declaration, paras 17–18.
50 Report of the OAU Central Organ Sub-Committee on the Preparation of a Blue Print for Dealing
with Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa (sub-cttee/central organ/rpt (III))
(1995) (copy on file with the authors).
51 See above at note 8.
52 OAU Charter, art III(5).
53 See van Walraven Dreams of Power, above at note 14 at 112 and 133.
54 Mercenarism Convention, preamble read in conjunction with art 1(2).
55 ECM/Res. 17 (1970) (copy on file with the authors).
56 Resolution on the Activities of Mercenaries in Zimbabwe and Namibia and against the
Front-Line States, CM/Res 695(XXXII) (1979) (copy on file with the authors).
57 Resolution on the Mercenary Aggression against the Republic of Seychelles, CM/Res.906
(XXXVIII) (1982).
58 Declaration on Equatorial Guinea, Assembly/AU/Dec.37(III) Rev.1 (2004).
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replace a democratically elected government”.59 The convention also repre-
sented the first serious attempt by the continental organization to criminalize
subversive acts internationally, an approach to which it returned decades later
when adopting the 2014 Malabo Protocol60 to establish an international crim-
inal jurisdiction for the AU’s judicial mechanism, including for mercenarism.
In the 1990s, over a series of meetings that coincided with a number of
coups (Sierra Leone 1997, Guinea Bissau 1998, Niger 1999, Comoros 1999 and
Côte d’Ivoire 1999), the OAU Central Organ Sub-Committee developed a frame-
work to address unconstitutional changes of government, drawing on the OAU
Charter, the African Charter, the Declaration on Fundamental Changes, the
Cairo Declaration and the Mercenarism Convention.61 It set out several
common values and principles for democratic governance and a list of eight
scenarios that should be understood as an unconstitutional change of govern-
ment that may trigger a continental response.62 Four definitions of the notion
of unconstitutional changes of government were maintained in the resulting
2000 Lomé Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to
Unconstitutional Changes of Government (Lomé Declaration). These defini-
tions focus on military, mercenary and rebel coups as well as refusals to accept
electoral outcomes.63 Yet, four other definitions were rejected: the refusal by a
government to organize elections at the end of its term of office in violation of
the constitution; any manipulation of the constitution aimed at preventing a
democratic change of government; any form of election rigging and electoral
malpractice, duly confirmed by the OAU or ascertained by an independent
and credible body established for that purpose; and systematic and persistent
violation of the common values and democratic principles referred to above.64
While these scenarios were excluded from the Lomé Declaration, these
forms of unacceptable behaviour gradually made their way back onto the
AU agenda. Manipulation of constitutions re-entered the debate during the
preparation of the ACDEG. Although the initial focus was on attempts “to pro-
long the tenure of office for the incumbent government”,65 this specific
59 ACDEG, art 23(2).
60 Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice
and Human Rights (2014) (Malabo Protocol), art 28H.
61 See Report of the OAU Central Organ Sub-Committee on the Preparation of a Blue Print for
Dealing With Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa, SUB-CTTEE/CENTRAL
ORGAN/RPT (III) (1995) (copy on file with the authors).
62 Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of the Algiers Decisions of the Assembly of
Heads of State and Government and the Council of Ministers on Unconstitutional Changes of
Government, CM/2166(LXXII)Rev.2 (2000), annex D (copy on file with the authors).
63 These definitions were later reproduced in the ACDEG; see art 23(1)–(4).
64 Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of the Algiers Decisions of the Assembly of Heads of
State and Government and the Council of Ministers on Unconstitutional Changes of Government,
CM/2166(LXXII)Rev.2 (2000), annex D (copy on file with the authors).
65 Report of the Ministerial Meeting on the Draft African Charter on Democracy, Elections and
Governance and on the Revision of the Lomé Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of
Government in Africa, EX.CL/258(IX) (2006), paras 40–44 (copy on file with the authors).
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provision was later changed to address the arguably broader, but more vague,
“infringement on the principles of democratic change of government”.66 One
characteristic of these excluded types of unconstitutional changes of govern-
ment is that they are less concerned with transfers of constitutional power
and external threats to the constitutional regime. Instead, they target the
undemocratic exercise of power by incumbent regimes. Although the idea
of sanctioning this sort of behaviour was previously rejected, momentum
has kept growing for the AU to pay more attention to this problem. The chal-
lenges posed by popular uprisings and presidential term limits, in particular,
and the question of how to deal with them, have increasingly led to calls for
the AU to address systematic violations of democratic norms by incumbent
regimes.67 To some extent, the AU has already acted on these norms by con-
doning popular uprisings during the Arab Spring68 and condemning (albeit
inconsistently) manipulations of constitutions and electoral fraud.69
The historical genesis of a number of policy agendas and instruments in the
(O)AU setting shows the gradual emergence, acceptance and consolidation of
core notions of democratic governance at the continental level. These notions
include a commitment to democracy, human rights and the principle of the
rule of law,70 peace, security and stability,71 constitutional rule (particularly con-
stitutional transfer of power),72 as well as sustainable development.73 Yet, simply
focusing on the development of these notions, or even presenting them as lin-
ear, steady progress towards a continental democratic government model,
would mask a series of tensions underlying these key continental agendas. As
shown above, the progress in developing the AU’s agenda on democratic govern-
ance was not so much one of constant innovation. Instead, it mostly concerned
reviving older, rejected ideas about continental norm setting and enforcement.
THE PRESENT: LEGALIZATION, TECHNOCRATIZATION AND
JUDICIALIZATION
Building on the observation about the increasingly more prominent role of the
AU in setting and enforcing continental governance standards, this section
66 ACDEG, art 23(5). See Wiebusch and Murray “Presidential term limits”, above at note 11.
67 See “Unconstitutional changes of governments and popular uprisings in Africa:
Challenges and lessons learnt”, (PSC press statement, PSC/PR/BR (CDXXXII), 2014) and
“Peace, security, prosperity and embracing the value of democracy and governance: Is
the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance adequate?” (PSC press
statement PSC/PR/BR (DCCXCI), 2018). See also Dersso “The status and legitimacy of
popular uprisings”, above at note 10; Manirakiza “Towards a right to resist”, above at
note 10; and Wiebusch and Murray “Presidential term limits”, above at note 11.
68 See Dersso and Manirakiza, ibid.
69 See Wiebusch and Murray “Presidential term limits”, above at note 11.
70 ACDEG, art 4.
71 Id, art 38.
72 Id, art 5.
73 Id, art 9.
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considers the implementation of the ACDEG. Specifically, it examines the imple-
mentation of the ACDEG in the context of three trends: the continental legaliza-
tion, technocratization and judicialization of politics.74 First, it focuses on the
growth of normative commitments in the field of democracy, elections and gov-
ernance and their increasing consolidation into binding legal treaties (turn to
law). Secondly, it explores the implementation and interpretation of these nor-
mative instruments, with a particular focus on the different initiatives to ensure
andmonitor compliance with these instruments, initiatives that are increasingly
reliant on technical experts without an explicit political or diplomatic mandate
(turn to experts). Thirdly, it assesses the expanding role of continental and
regional judicial bodies in enforcing commitments to democratic governance
(turn to courts). In examining these trends, the article explains how the
ACDEG is both a result of these processes as well as a catalyst accelerating them.
Legalization
The ACDEG’s status as a treaty represents a significant milestone in the norma-
tive development of the African continental governance system. Unlike vari-
ous policy declarations on democracy and governance that preceded it, such
as the Lomé Declaration (2000) and the (O)AU Declaration on the Principles
Governing Democratic Elections in Africa (2002), the ACDEG was designed as
a binding legal instrument. Locking in the various continental commitments
and making the ACDEG part of the AU’s treaty regime has a number of advan-
tages and disadvantages, and at the same time reflects certain beliefs about the
role of law in addressing societal problems.
Since 1963 the (O)AU has developed more than 60 multilateral treaties.75
Their subject matter covers a range of issues, including economic integration
(such as free trade), social affairs (such as culture and sport), human rights
(such as women, children and internally displaced persons), security (such
as road safety and cyber security) and institutional frameworks (such as the
PSC and Pan-African Parliament). The form of these AU treaties differs, from
establishing a unique treaty (for example the Mercenarism Convention),
74 While the focus here lies at the continental level, similar trends have been discussed in a
more general “international” sense. See, for example, J Goldstein, M Kahler, RO Keohane
and AM Slaughter “Introduction: Legalization and world politics” (2000) 54/3
International Organization 385; D Kennedy A World of Struggle: How Power, Law, and
Expertise Shape Global Political Economy (2016, Princeton University Press); and K Alter
The New Terrain of International Law: Courts, Politics, Rights (2014, Princeton University
Press). The framework of legalization, technocratization and judicialization is inspired
by the concept of “regional constitutionalism”, developed by Cebulak and Wiebusch,
which draws on a similar structure to explore and interrogate possible tensions and
channels of interaction between regional organizations and constitutional law; see P
Cebulak and M Wiebusch “Comparative regional constitutionalism: Towards a research
agenda” (paper presented at the International Society of Public Law (ICON·S) Conference
on Borders, Otherness and Public Law, Berlin, 17–19 June 2016).
75 An overview of different AU treaties is available at: <https://au.int/en/treaties> (last
accessed 10 January 2019).
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complementing an existing treaty by the adoption of protocols (for example
the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the
Rights of Women in Africa), to revising existing treaties (such as the 2006
Charter for African Cultural Renaissance replacing the 1975 Cultural Charter
for Africa). Remarkably there has been an exponential growth of the continen-
tal treaty regime since the establishment of the AU. Over the course of almost
four decades (1963–99), the OAU adopted 20 treaties (less than 40 per cent of
the total number of treaties). In contrast the AU has adopted more than 40
treaties (more than 60 per cent of the total number) in less than two decades
(2000–18). This trend reflects a greater institutionalization of continental gov-
ernance mechanisms through law. It also suggests a level of confidence within
the AU system in the ability of law to engineer social change.
The ACEDG is not only an important instrument in the body of AU treaty
law. It has also contributed to the AU’s law-making process. Since its adoption,
the ACDEG has given rise directly and indirectly to three more AU treaties.
First, the African Charter on Values and Principles of Public Service and
Administration was adopted in 2011. This instrument builds on the ACDEG
by giving more detail to its objectives related to improved public sector man-
agement, with a particular focus on transparency, access, and more efficient
and effective public service delivery.76 Secondly, in line with the commitment
established in article 34 of the ACDEG, which calls upon state parties to
“decentralize power to democratically elected local authorities as provided
in national laws”, the African Charter on the Values and Principles of
Decentralisation, Local Governance and Local Development was adopted in
2014. This treaty outlines various principles, values and mechanisms to bolster
the role of local governments and local authorities as cornerstones of demo-
cratic governance systems and economic development.77 Both these instru-
ments have a remarkable structural and procedural resemblance to the
ACDEG, especially with regard to their envisaged implementation. Each of
them outlines similar roles at the national, regional and continental levels for
giving effect to the commitments contained in the respective charter, together
with respective state reporting mechanisms coordinated by the AU Commission.
Thirdly, one of the key innovations established in the ACDEG is the possibility of
trying perpetrators of unconstitutional changes of government or coups d’état
through a continental judicial mechanism.78 This mechanism was further ela-
borated in the Malabo Protocol, which grants criminal jurisdiction to a yet to
be established merged African Court of Justice and Human Rights with specific
jurisdiction over the “crime of unconstitutional change of government”.79 The
76 See ACDEG, arts 2(10), 3(7)–(9), 27(4)–(5), 32(1) and 33(1)–(3).
77 See African Charter on the Values and Principles of Decentralisation, Local Governance
and Local Development, preamble and arts 2 and 7.
78 ACDEG, art 25(5).
79 The Malabo Protocol (above at note 60) also establishes the jurisdiction of an African
court for piracy, corruption and terrorism, among other international crimes. As of
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definition of the crime also extends the typology of unconstitutional changes of
government by adding as a sixth possible qualification: “any substantial modifi-
cation to the electoral laws in the last six (6) months before the elections without
the consent of the majority of the political actors”.80
This move towards more (treaty) law has a series of apparent advantages. The
adoption of treaties and their subsequent ratification, which establishes at the
international plane a state’s consent to be bound by a treaty,81 signal a more
credible commitment by states and the AU (as a forum and through its insti-
tutions) to the principles and objectives set out in a treaty.82 A treaty also
unlocks a number of possible enforcement mechanisms generally not
available with other sources of non-binding or soft law. This may include mon-
itoring mechanisms in the form of state reporting or coercive enforcement by
the PSC or (quasi)judicial bodies such as the ACHPR and the ACtHPR.83
Furthermore, a whole set of techniques can be deployed to appeal for signature,
ratification and implementation, routinely pronounced by AU policy organs
and governance monitoring mechanisms (including the Assembly, Executive
Council, PSC, African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and AU Election
Observation Missions (AUEOMs)). The AU also developed a range of specific prac-
tices, including: an AU treaty signing week to encourage member states to com-
mit to treaties they have not yet signed; AU advocacy and ratification campaigns
to maximize treaty ratification; and technical assistance projects to help states
overcome obstacles related to ratification.84 Treaties also facilitate mobilization
by civil society actors to raise awareness and advocate for compliance.85
contd
January 2019, 11 countries had signed the protocol, but none had yet ratified it. The
protocol only enters into force after the deposit of instruments of ratification by 15
member states.
80 Id, art 28E. This definition appears to be transplanted from the ECOWAS Protocol on
Democracy and Good Governance (2001), art 2(1).
81 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention), art 2(1)(b).
82 KW Abbott and D Snidal “Hard and soft law in international governance” (2000) 54/3
International Organization 421 at 426.
83 On the understanding of “coercive enforcement” as an imposition of costs on violators of
international law to foster compliance, see A Thompson “Coercive enforcement of inter-
national law” in JL Dunoff and MA Pollack (eds) Interdisciplinary Perspectives on
International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art (2012, Cambridge
University Press) 502.
84 T Maluwa “Ratification of African Union treaties by member states: Law, policy and prac-
tice” (2012) 13/2 Melbourne Journal of International Law 1 at 40. In 2012 the Executive
Council also established a Ministerial Committee and a Standing Committee of
Experts to address the “challenges of ratification / accession and implementation of
OAU / AU treaties”, EX.CL/Dec. 705 (XXI). The Department of Legal Affairs of the AU
Commission (Office of the Legal Counsel) has also organized various training sessions
to build the capacity of national legislative drafters and to promote the domestic imple-
mentation of AU treaties.
85 See, for example, A Mangu “African civil society and the promotion of the African
Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance” (2012) 12 African Human Rights Law
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However, treaties also pose a number of challenges. First, they may take a
longer time to draft and to attract a sufficiently broad substantive consen-
sus. For instance, the ACDEG was developed over a series of 16 different
meetings convened at various levels over a period of almost four years.
Secondly, reaching the sufficient number of ratifications for treaties to
enter into force may also take considerable time, five years (2007–12) in
the case of the ACDEG. This challenge was specifically acknowledged in
2009 in relation to the AU’s limited effectiveness in responding to unconsti-
tutional changes of government. Recognizing a “resurgence of the scourge
of coups d’état in Africa”86 in 2009 and the slow ratification rate of the
ACDEG,87 the Assembly reiterated the provisions set out in chapter 8 of
the ACDEG (sanctions against unconstitutional changes of government) in
a binding Assembly decision to supplement and strengthen the existing
sanctions regime in the Lomé Declaration.88
Technocratization
The challenge of ensuring a treaty’s adequate implementation has been a key
component of the AU’s recent agenda to transition from “norm-setting to
norm-implementation”.89 To ensure adequate implementation of the
ACDEG, the AU developed a comprehensive compliance system. Besides estab-
lishing different procedures to enforce and protect certain democratic stan-
dards under its “unconstitutional changes of government” agenda,90 the
ACDEG also has a crucial role in monitoring and promoting a number of
democratic norms. Essentially, the charter serves as a benchmark to survey
the state of democratic governance in different AU member states. If neces-
sary, the AU can then develop assistance programmes to help member states
bring their governance arrangements in line with agreed continental
contd
Journal 348; S Gilbert “The campaign to promote the African Union Charter on
Democracy, Elections and Governance: Insights into advocacy on the African continent”
(2013) U4 Practice Insight 3.
86 Decision on the Resurgence of the Scourge of Coups d’Etat in Africa,
Assembly/AU/Dec.220(XII) (2009).
87 Interim Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Prevention of Unconstitutional
Changes of Government Through Appropriate Measures and Strengthening the Capacity of the
African Union to Manage Such Situations, Assembly/AU/7(XIII) (2009) at 15 (copy on file
with the authors).
88 Decision on the Prevention of Unconstitutional Changes of Government and
Strengthening the Capacity of the African Union to Manage Such Situations,
Assembly/AU/Dec.269(XIV) Rev.1 (2010).
89 See, for example, statement by HE Dr Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, chairperson of the AU
Commission, on the occasion of the commemoration of Africa Human Rights Day under
the theme, “Women’s rights: Our collective responsibility” (21 October 2016), available
at: <https://au.int/en/newsevents/31522/commemoration-africa-human-rights-day> (last
accessed 10 January 2019).
90 See above at note 8.
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standards.91 The types of AU mechanisms through which the quality of gov-
ernance is assessed are increasing in both number and scale. This increase
can be explained by a combination of factors, including institutional emula-
tion, a certain level of path dependency and a growing turn to conflict preven-
tion. Underlying this expanding compliance system is a trend to rely more and
more on AU bureaucrats and experts to monitor and provide technical assist-
ance to ensure the implementation of AU instruments. One of the key conse-
quences of this trend is the gradual expansion of the AU’s authority. This is
not to say that the AU has necessarily gained much in decision-making
powers, which generally remain in the purview of diplomats and politicians.
However, the increased reliance by member states on AU bureaucrats and
experts does lead to important gains in AU influence by allowing these tech-
nocrats to have a key role in setting the agenda for decision-making92 and
framing the context in which decisions are made.93
One of the most innovative outcomes of the ACDEG has been the develop-
ment of an African Governance Architecture (AGA) since July 2010.94 The
AGA is conceptualized as “a platform for dialogue between the various stake-
holders with the mandate to promote good governance and strengthen dem-
ocracy in Africa”95 and is operationalized through the African Governance
Platform.96 The platform has as its primary objective the implementation of
the ACDEG.97 Its Secretariat is hosted by the Department of Political Affairs
of the AU Commission, which is responsible for coordinating the implemen-
tation of the ACDEG as mandated by article 45(c) of the ACDEG.
The most direct mechanism to monitor and enhance compliance with
the ACDEG is a state reporting mechanism. Every two years state parties are
obliged to submit a report of the various measures they have taken to give
effect to the principles and commitments in the ACDEG.98 The reports are
91 See ACDEG, arts 18, 44(2)(A)(c) and 45(b).
92 A Chayes, A Handler Chayes and RB Mitchell “Managing compliance: A comparative per-
spective” in B Weiss and H Jacobson (eds) Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with
International Environmental Accords (1998, MIT Press) 39 at 60.
93 Kennedy A World of Struggle, above at note 74 at 7.
94 Decision on the Theme, Date and Venue of the 16th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of
the African Union, Assembly/AU/Dec.304(XV) (2010).
95 Rules of Procedure of the African Governance Platform (2016), rule 1.
96 Id, rule 3. The platform is the AGA’s institutional mechanism and comprises the APRM,
ACHPR, ACtHPR, AU Commission, PSC, African Committee of Experts on the Rights and
Welfare of the Child, AU Advisory Board on Corruption, AU Commission on
International Law, the Economic, Social and Cultural Council, NEPAD Planning and
Coordinating Agency, Pan-African Parliament, regional economic communities and
any other existing AU organ or institution that may be given the mandate or established
by the Assembly to promote governance, democracy and human rights (id, rule 2).
97 Id, rule 3. See also ACDEG, arts 44, 45 and 49.
98 ACDEG, art 49(1).
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expected to be developed based on a set of guidelines adopted in 2016.99 This
mechanism builds on the institutional experience within the AU in respect of
other treaties, including the African Charter (see section on “The past” above).
It differs, though, in its central coordinating role, which is accorded to the AU
Commission instead of the ACHPR. So far only one state (Togo) has submitted a
report,100 although 29 reports were due as of January 2019.101 As of January
2019, more than 20 months after the submission of the Togo report, the con-
cluding observations and recommendations based on the state report have
still not been communicated. However, the state reporting guidelines provide
that the “entire review process of each State Party report shall take no more
than nine (9) months”.102 These developments raise serious questions concern-
ing the effectiveness of this monitoring mechanism.
The ACDEG also mandates the AU Commission to prepare a synthesized
report on the implementation of the charter.103 This report shall contain “spe-
cific and concise recommendations to the Assembly and State Parties on mea-
sures necessary to effectively implement the Democracy Charter”.104 The
preparation of such a report and the selection of information made by the
AU Commission, grant it an influential role in framing the issues and debates
on which the Assembly and Executive Council are then to decide. To date, the
AU Commission has not yet fully seized the potential offered by this tool, as
only two reports have been prepared to address this treaty obligation.105
These treaty reporting mechanisms show the emphasis placed on transpar-
ency and information sharing as key conditions to ensure compliance.106
Eventually, the self-reporting by state parties and independent reporting by
the AU Commission may also lead to a level of harmonization of governance
arrangements through the adoption of concluding observations and recom-
mendations from which fellow member states can emulate best practices
99 “Guidelines for state parties’ reports under the ACDEG” (2016) in Rules of Procedure of
the African Governance Platform, annex 1, available at: <http://aga-platform.
org/sites/default/files/2018-10/Rules%20Of%20Procedure%20FINAL.pdf> (last accessed
21 February 2019).
100 “Togo, first AU member state to submit state report on African Charter on Democracy,
Elections and Governance” (AU press statement 044/2017, 27 March 2017), available at:
<https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20170327/togo-first-au-member-state-submit-state-report-
african-charter-democracy> (last accessed 10 January 2019).
101 Theoretically, several states should already have reported twice (for example, Côte
d’Ivoire, Mali and Sudan) or three times (for example, Benin, Malawi and Nigeria), as
they ratified the ACDEG more than four and six years ago, respectively.
102 “Guidelines for state parties’ reports”, above at note 99, para 32.
103 ACDEG, art 49(3).
104 “Guidelines for state parties’ reports”, above at note 99, para 36.
105 See Decision on Report of the Commission on Governance in Africa (with Focus on
the African Governance Architecture and Elections), Assembly/AU/Dec.585(XXV)
(2015) and Decision on Governance, Constitutionalism and Elections in Africa,
Assembly/AU/Dec.592(XXVI) (2016).
106 Chayes, Handler Chayes and Mitchell “Managing compliance”, above at note 92.
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and take steps to avoid receiving similar critique on their governance
systems.107
This rationale of “managing” compliance through “cooperative processes of
consultation, analysis, and persuasion, rather than coercive punishment”108 is
similarly embedded in the APRM, which uses the ACDEG as one of its main
benchmarks to assess the quality of the political governance of APRMmember
states.109 Through an external review and a country self-assessment,
complemented by a peer review process at the level of heads of state and gov-
ernment, best practices and challenges are identified to improve the continen-
tal governance landscape. The ACDEG even establishes a direct and indirect
link with the APRM.110 Article 36 of the ACDEG obliges states to “promote
and deepen democratic governance by implementing the principles and
core values of … the African Peer Review Mechanism”. Article 16 exhorts states
to “cooperate at regional and continental levels in building and consolidating
democracy through exchange of experiences”. This provision clearly intersects
with the philosophical foundation of the APRM. Examples of best practices
highlighted in APRM country review reports that overlap with ACDEG
norms include “compliance with the electoral timetable for presidential and
legislative elections”,111 “democratic changeover at the helm of state affairs:
expressing a shared culture of democracy, tolerance and fair play”112 and
the “declaration and publication of assets as a signal of commitment to
good governance” by the president.113
The idea of sharing experiences is not unique to the APRM. It also figures
prominently in the AU’s electoral support agenda. This agenda consists of
two core mandates: election observation and electoral assistance. The
ACDEG has become the principal instrument for AU electoral assistance and
observation efforts. Over the past decade the AU has greatly professionalized
its operations in evaluating domestic electoral processes against international
and continental standards. Before, AUEOMs were largely diplomatic missions
with small observer teams comprising career diplomats and a limited number
of AU staff. Gradually these missions have become more technical, composed
primarily of election experts from the AU Commission, election management
107 See also ACDEG, art 44(2)(A)(b), concerning the objective of harmonizing the policies and
laws of state parties to promote favourable conditions for democratic governance.
108 Chayes, Handler Chayes and Mitchell “Managing compliance”, above at note 92 at 41.
109 Although the APRM assesses four domains of governance, ACDEG provisions are most
closely associated with the APRM’s democracy and political governance mandate, rather
than the three other thematic areas it assesses (economic governance and management,
corporate governance and socio-economic development). Although the ACDEG touches
upon these areas, they are generally not considered to be its main focus, especially since
these areas are regulated in more detail in other AU instruments.
110 The APRM is also a member of the African Governance Platform. See above at note 96.
111 APRM Country Review Report of Benin (2008) at 77. See for example ACDEG, arts 3(4) and 17.
112 APRM Country Review Report of Benin, id at 79. See for example ACDEG, arts 2(3) and 23(5).
113 APRM Country Review Report of Nigeria (2009) at 18. See for example ACDEG, art 12(1).
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bodies and civil society.114 Some of the most notable developments have
included: transition of AUEOMs from short term observation to long term
observation missions; institutionalized training sessions for AU election obser-
vers (short and long term observation missions, election, media and legal
experts); consolidation of the practice of sending AUEOMs to all parliamentary
and presidential elections; and improvement and standardization of the
observation methodology and reporting. The ACDEG also led to a more
meticulous approach to the assessment of elections through the deployment
of pre-election assessment missions.115 In a form of path dependency, the
increased level of detail in the assessments also contributes to a finer level
of recommendations to specific target groups. These recommendations then
form the basis of technical assistance programmes, as seen, for example, in
Malawi (2015), Côte d’Ivoire (2015), Madagascar (2016), Cameroon (2016),
Somalia (2017) and Zimbabwe (2018). The AU through its Democracy and
Electoral Assistance Unit (DEAU)116 has gradually developed its capacity to
organize follow-up missions to strengthen electoral institutions and improve
electoral processes through the deployment of experts to support election
management bodies and by facilitating peer-to-peer learning among election
authorities.117
Generally, the AU’s involvement has, unsurprisingly, been greatest in
country contexts associated with electoral violence, which is still a recur-
rent practice on the African continent. These conflict dynamics have also
led to a greater role and involvement for the PSC in the implementation
of the ACDEG by it holding regular sessions on elections in Africa and
addressing election-related political tensions.118 This more pro-active
approach reflects the underlying logic to invest more time and effort into
conflict prevention.119
114 Id, art 21(2). See CC Aniekwe and SM Atuobi “Two decades of election observation by the
African Union: A review” (2016) 15/1 Journal of African Elections 25 at 32–33.
115 ACDEG, art 20.
116 Decision on the Establishment and Organization of a Democracy and Electoral
Assistance Unit and Fund, EX.CL/Dec.300 (IX) (2006). The DEAU was established in
2006 and became fully operationalized in 2008.
117 See, for example, “African Union BRIDGE training for the Independent National Electoral
Commission opens today in Antananarivo, Republic of Madagascar” (6 October 2018),
available at: <https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20161006-0> (last accessed 10 January
2019); “African Union Commission convenes 4th annual continental forum of election
management bodies” (8 November 2017), available at: <https://au.int/en/press
releases/20171108/african-union-commission-convenes-4th-annual-continental-forum-
election> (last accessed 10 January 2019).
118 See, for example, PSC Communiqué of the 747th Meeting (18 January 2018), AU doc
PSC/PR/COMM (DCCXLVII).
119 See, for example, PSC Communiqué of the 589th Meeting (12 April 2016), AU doc
PSC/PR/COMM (DLXXXIX) and PSC Press Statement of the 791st Meeting (22 August
2018), AU doc PSC/PR/BR (DCCXCI).
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Judicialization
One of the most notable developments concerning the ACDEG is the deter-
mination by the ACtHPR, in its judgment in APDH v Côte d’Ivoire, that the char-
ter constitutes a human rights instrument.120 This finding established the
justiciability of the ACDEG, which means that litigants can now claim rights
enshrined in the charter before the ACtHPR.121 The judgment gives an indica-
tion of the ACDEG’s potential as an instrument through which to challenge
questionable governance practices and rights violations by means of litigation.
This development is remarkable for two reasons. First, this enforcement
mechanism was not explicitly foreseen in the ACDEG. Secondly, the
ACtHPR’s growing role in reinforcing democratic regimes by developing case
law and normative guidance on some essential aspects of democratic govern-
ance reflects a global trend of judicializing politics, where courts are increas-
ingly relied upon to “address core moral predicaments, public policy
questions, and political controversies”.122
The unanticipated role of the ACtHPR in enforcing the ACDEG can be
deduced from the debates that informed the court’s decision. The court has
jurisdiction over all human rights instruments ratified by the states involved
in proceedings before it.123 To establish whether the ACDEG is a human rights
instrument, the court requested an opinion from the AU Commission and the
African Institute for International Law. In line with their submissions the
court followed a purposive interpretation and concluded that the ACDEG is
a human rights instrument, since it expressly enunciates subjective rights
and prescribes obligations for states for the enjoyment of those rights.124 In
its reasoning, the ACtHPR did not refer to preparatory work for the ACDEG,
probably as there is no mention of the idea that the ACDEG would be consid-
ered a justiciable instrument. The ACDEG does refer to a “competent court of
the Union” potentially to try perpetrators of unconstitutional changes of gov-
ernment.125 In earlier drafts, the “African Court of Justice and Human Rights”
was envisaged to exercise this role.126 With the adoption of the Malabo
120 Actions pour la Protection des Droits de l’Homme (APDH) v Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, (APDH v
Côte d’Ivoire) appln no 001/2014, paras 47–65. See G Niyungeko “The African Charter
on Democracy, Elections and Governance as a human rights instrument” in this issue.
121 See B Kioko “The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance as a justi-
ciable instrument” in this issue.
122 R Hirschl “The judicialization of politics” in GA Caldeira, RD Kelemen and KE
Whittington (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics (2008, Oxford University
Press) 119 at 119.
123 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of
the African Court (1998) (Court Protocol), art 3(1).
124 APDH v Côte d’Ivoire, above at note 120, paras 57–65.
125 ACDEG, art 25(5).
126 Report of the Ministerial Meeting on the Draft African Charter on Democracy, Elections and
Governance and on the Revision of the Lomé Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of
Government in Africa, EX.CL/258(IX) (2006) (copy on file with the authors).
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Protocol, the jurisdiction to try individuals for the “crime of unconstitutional
change of government” was specifically delegated to the International
Criminal Law section of the merged court.127 However, establishing criminal
responsibility constitutes a completely different judicial process. Among
other things, it is targeted at individuals, while ACtHPR adjudication of pos-
sible infringements of rights protected in the ACDEG has states as defendants
and results in different types of remedies.
The judicialization of politics on the African continent is most apparent in
the role played by continental and regional courts in establishing judicial
oversight of electoral processes.128 For example, in the case of APDH v Côte
d’Ivoire, the ACtHPR had to evaluate the legitimacy of the Côte d’Ivoire’s elec-
tion management body. It resulted in the court setting standards for the
“independence” of election management bodies, as prescribed by article 17
of the ACDEG, and ordering the state to make its electoral law compliant
with relevant international instruments, including the ACDEG.129 However,
this is not the only time the ACtHPR has adjudicated on electoral matters.
For example, in Mtikila v Tanzania it established that a ban on independent
electoral candidates violated the right to political participation (article 13 of
the African Charter) and directed the state to amend its constitution.130
Regional courts in Africa, such as the Economic Community of West African
States Court of Justice (ECOWAS Court), developed similar jurisprudence on
electoral processes. For example, in a case against Burkina Faso, the
ECOWAS Court decided in 2015 that an electoral law excluding candidates
associated with the previously ousted regime violated the right to participate
freely in elections and ordered the state to remove relevant obstacles to elect-
oral participation.131 These instances show the broader tendency of contin-
ental and regional courts in Africa to adjudicate on violations that require
change in national legislative frameworks. In those instances the remedies
go beyond reparations for individual victims and take the form of constitu-
tional review. As a result, these courts adjudicate, and thereby become
involved in, salient political and constitutional disputes at the domestic
level.
127 Malabo Protocol, art 17.
128 Hirschl “The judicialization of politics”, above at note 122 at 126.
129 The ACtHPR established that “an electoral body is independent where it has administra-
tive and financial autonomy; and offers sufficient guarantees of its members’ independ-
ence and impartiality”: APDH v Côte d’Ivoire, above at note 120, para 118.
130 See Tanganyika Law Society and Legal and Human Rights Centre and Reverend Christopher R
Mtikila v United Republic of Tanzania (Mtikila v Tanzania) appln nos 009 and 011/2011.
131 Congrès pour la Démocratie et le Progrès (CDP) et Autres v l’Etat du Burkina ECOWAS Court of
Justice judgment no ECW/CCJ/JUG/16/15. Remarkably, the applicants in this case also
invoked a violation of the ACDEG. However, the court did not explicitly base its ruling
on the ACDEG.
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The ACtHPR’s advisory procedure is another likely avenue for judicial policy-
making. Besides contentious proceedings, the ACtHPR has a mandate to issue
advisory opinions “on any legal matter relating to the Charter or any other
relevant human rights instruments”.132 It is imaginable that “member states,
the AU, any of its organs, or any African organization recognised by the AU”133
may request the court to give an interpretation of certain rules and principles
enshrined in the ACDEG. Although these opinions would not be binding per
se, they would be authoritative. The procedure would provide the ACtHPR with
an opportunity to elaborate on the meaning of principles, standards and obli-
gations enshrined in the ACDEG that fall within the scope of the request
made. The ACtHPR had already been requested to provide a clarification of
the ACDEG, specifically in connection to article 23 concerning the possibility
of bringing a case against a state before the ACHPR or the ACtHPR following
an unconstitutional change of government.134 However, the ACtHPR decided
that it could not give an opinion on the request because the applicant did
not meet the conditions of an “African organization recognised by the AU”
and therefore the court lacked personal jurisdiction.135 Although, this mechan-
ism has been under-utilized to date, partly due to restrictive access rules,136 it is
likely that more requests for advisory opinions will be submitted in the future.
THE FUTURE: CONTEXTUAL FACTORS SHAPING
IMPLEMENTATION
The ACDEG’s track record in its first decade offers cause for both optimism
and concern about its future implementation. Successes to date include the
development of new and improved governance accountability mechanisms,
which have contributed to an overall higher quality of elections137 and
more dynamic human rights enforcement.138 At the same time, as high-
lighted above, various contextual factors still impede the realization of the
objectives set out in the ACDEG. These factors can be grouped into three
broad categories: legal context; actor dynamics; and socio-political context.
Due to spatial constraints, this section does not consider in great detail the
whole range of factors that may impair or propel the ACDEG’s future operatio-
nalization. Instead, it focuses on the most salient issues related to the trends
outlined above.
132 Court Protocol, art 4(1).
133 Ibid.
134 Rencontre Africain pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme, request no 002/2014.
135 Id, paras 38–39.
136 A Jones “Form over substance: The African Court’s restrictive approach to NGO standing
in the SERAP advisory opinion” (2017) 17 African Human Rights Law Journal 321.
137 “Better elections, but not a better participatory environment”: 2018 Ibrahim Index of
African Governance Report (2018, Mo Ibrahim Foundation) at 40.
138 See Kioko “The African Charter”, above at note 121.
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Legal context
A number of legal factors, including normative, institutional and procedural
factors, will continue to influence heavily the extent of the ACDEG’s imple-
mentation. Normative factors include both the binding quality of the set of
rules as well as the subject matter on which behaviour is prescribed or prohib-
ited. First, in terms of the issue of membership already highlighted in the sec-
tion on “The present” above, treaties are generally only binding on those states
that have ratified the instruments or, in other words, become members of the
particular treaty regime.139 Therefore, full continental implementation of the
ACDEG can only be achieved through full continental ratification of the
ACDEG.140 To achieve this, ratification is needed from an additional 23 AU
member states. Encouragingly, 17 out of those 23 states have already signed
the treaty, which is often an important stepping stone towards ratification.141
At the same time, several states have been a signatory for more than ten years
(for example, Burundi, Mauritius, Eswatini (Swaziland), The Gambia, Kenya
and Senegal). Secondly, the authors anticipate strong variation in the imple-
mentation of the ACDEG across different policy issues. The ACDEG provides
minimum standards across a wide range of governance areas. Compliance
with some rules and principles will be less problematic to ensure than others.
For example, in many countries, accomplishing the goal of organizing regular
free and fair elections142 will likely precede the achievement of gender balance
and equality in decision-making processes.143 Systematic monitoring of the
ACDEG will allow the detection of disproportionate divergences in implemen-
tation, which may result in more targeted interventions, including through
advocacy and assistance programmes, as well as through complementary coer-
cive enforcement, to bring all national policies gradually into conformity with
agreed continental standards.
Several institutional factors will impact implementation. The most import-
ant factor here is, arguably, capacity. The challenge of capacity (financial, tech-
nical and human) is well-known both within member states as well as within
different AU institutions. A lack of capacity within national law and policy mak-
ing organs can impede various crucial aspects of the ACDEG’s implementation,
ranging from organizing the ratification processes and developing
139 For current purposes, included in this understanding is the act of “accession”, as it has
the same legal effects as ratification. See Vienna Convention, art 2(1)(b).
140 CC Aniekwe, L Oette, S Vandeginste and M Wiebusch “Policy brief on the 10th anniver-
sary of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance” (2017) at 8,
available at: <https://www.uantwerpen.be/images/uantwerpen/container2673/files/
PolicyBrief-AfricanCharter.pdf> (last accessed 10 January 2019).
141 Vienna Convention, arts 12 and 18.
142 ACDEG, arts 2, 3, 17 and 32(7).
143 Id, arts 2, 3 and 29. For an analysis of the implementation of the ACDEG specifically in
relation to gender dimensions, see N Abdulmelik and T Belay “Advancing women’s pol-
itical rights in Africa: The promise and potential of the African Charter on Democracy,
Elections and Governance” (2019) Africa Spectrum (forthcoming).
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implementation legislation and policies, to carrying out procedural treaty obli-
gations such as state reporting. It is likely that ACDEG state reporting will face
challenges similar to those other AU state reporting mechanisms have encoun-
tered. Comparative experience with the African Charter and the commitment
shown so far by state parties suggest that, at least in the short-term, ACDEG
state reporting will be characterized by late, ad-hoc, vague and limited report-
ing.144 These factors, combined with an increasing onus on states to report
on a multitude of instruments, especially since all new AU governance instru-
ments also create state reporting duties, risk undermining the impact of treaty
reporting mechanisms.145 However, the ACDEG does establish a mandate for
the AU Commission to “provide technical support for effective implementation
of the Charter”.146 This mandate, which implies further continental technocra-
tization, may form a solution to overcome national capacity problems, pro-
vided that the AU itself is endowed with sufficient capacity. It is worth
noting here that article 7 of the ACDEG even imposes an obligation on state par-
ties to “strengthen [AU organs] and endow them with necessary resources”.
One of the most significant procedural factors to influence the implemen-
tation of the ACDEG is access rules. The section on “The past” above showed
that AUEOMs developed in such a way that formal invitations are no longer
required. This practice helps circumvent attempts by governments to renego-
tiate the terms under which observation missions are organized, particularly
when their objective is submitting the mission to unfavourable restrictions,
including vetting election observers or unduly narrowing the scope of the
observation mandate.147 Upholding this approach will greatly contribute to
the credibility of AUEOMs. Furthermore, access rules are also crucial in
enforcement processes. As demonstrated above, the ACtHPR may have a cru-
cial role in enforcing the rights and principles enshrined in the ACDEG.
However, as of January 2019, only 30 states have accepted the court’s jurisdic-
tion and just nine states have granted individuals and qualified NGOs (the
main protagonists of international human rights litigation) direct access to
the court.148 This limited access undermines the development of a compre-
hensive continental accountability regime. Access rules may also refer to
entry points for civil society organizations to call directly for political support
144 M Evans and R Murray “The state reporting mechanism of the African Charter” in
M Evans and R Murray (eds) The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The System
in Practice 1986–2006 (2008, Cambridge University Press) 49.
145 See in respect of developments on UN treaty reporting mechanisms in this regard,
I Bantekas and L Oette International Human Rights Law and Practice (2018, Cambridge
University Press) at 205–08.
146 “Guidelines for state parties’ reports”, above at note 99, para 34.
147 T Legler and TK Tieku “What difference can a path make? Regional democracy promo-
tion regimes in the Americas and Africa” (2010) 17/3 Democratization 465 at 481.
148 Court Protocol, arts 5(3) and 34(6).
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from the AU (ie the AU Commission chairperson or the PSC) in enforcing
ACDEG provisions, particularly in the case of an imminent political crisis.149
A failure to grant them adequate access would not only undermine the
AU’s credibility and legitimacy, but also risks losing important allies in the
promotion of better governance on the African continent.150
Actor dynamics
The ACDEG’s broad thematic focus leads to the involvement of a wide range of
actors both at state as well as AU level. First, following the liberal tradition, the
state can be disaggregated into various sub-state components, including gov-
ernment, courts, Parliament, public administration, electoral bodies, media
and civil society. The ACDEG itself already expressly implicates a diverse set
of sub-state actors that are part of its implementation constituency (see
Table 1). Secondly, the AGA Platform also consolidates an extensive number
of AU bodies with a mandate to implement the ACDEG (see Table 1).
Implementation of the ACDEG will be dependent on the level of synergy
among and between these implementation partners, including, for example,
between: the Pan-African Parliament and national Parliaments; the AU’s
Economic Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) and civil society organiza-
tions; the ACtHPR and constitutional and supreme courts, as well as the
broader legal community comprising judges, lawyers, legal academics, bar
associations and (transnational) NGOs; and the DEAU and electoral bodies,
as well as other key electoral stakeholders such as political parties. The AU’s
strategy of increasing its engagement with its implementation partners in a
holistic manner will facilitate its efforts in holding states to account and col-
lectively build momentum to improve levels of democratic governance. This
cooperative engagement might then also encourage more robust enforcement
of the ACDEG through political pressure in the AU policy organs (the Assembly
and Executive Council). For example, article 46 of the ACDEG establishes an, as
yet unused, sanctioning mechanism for violations of the ACDEG through the
Assembly and PSC. Without sufficient domestic and transnational political
support it is unlikely that a wide enough consensus will materialize in such
political fora to sanction other governments for the violation of legal
commitments.
149 See AWitt “Where regional norms matter: Contestation and the domestic impact of the
African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance” (2019) Africa Spectrum
(forthcoming).
150 See A Witt “Whose charter? How civil society makes (not) use of the African Democracy
Charter” (2019) PRIF Spotlight (forthcoming).
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Table 1. Implementation of ACDEG: Contextual factors
LEGAL CONTEXT ACTOR DYNAMICS SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT
STATE LEVEL AU LEVEL
NORMATIVE
Membership
Subject variation
INSTITUTIONAL
Capacity
PROCEDURAL
Access
• Government
• Judiciary
• Parliament
• Public administration
• Armed and security forces
• Electoral body
• Public institutions that
promote and support
democracy and
constitutional order
• Political parties
• Media
• Civil society organizations
• Private sector
• Citizens
• Assembly
• Executive Council
• PSC
• AU Commission
• ACtHPR
• APRM
• ACHPR
• Pan-African Parliament
• African Committee of Experts on
the Rights and Welfare of the
Child
• AU Advisory Board on Corruption
• ECOSOCC
• New Partnership for Africa’s
Development
• Regional economic communities
Powerful vs weak states
Authoritarian vs rule of law
regimes
(Post)conflict vs stable states
Source: Authors’ own compilation.
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Socio-political context
The implementation of the ACDEG is also dependent on particular socio-
political contexts. First, realist accounts would expect implementation of
the ACDEG to be contingent on the interests of powerful states. The “big
five” member states that contribute the vast majority of the AU budget are
South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt and Libya. Of these five, only three
(South Africa, Nigeria and Algeria) have ratified the ACDEG and none has
accepted direct access by individuals and NGOs to the ACtHPR. Support by
these states for implementation of the ACDEG would increase the likelihood
of “binding weaker states to the system” as well as allowing the “stronger
powers to bear the costs of enforcement”.151
Secondly, the level of implementation will also vary according to the quality
of the governmental regime. Implementation of international agreements is
more probable in rule of law regimes152 than in authoritarian states.153 Of
course, this observation is almost tautological considering that the ACDEG’s
subject matter is precisely the promotion of democracy, human rights and
the rule of law. Nevertheless, if, for example, the ACtHPR’s energetic seizure
of its mandate (including enforcing the ACDEG) is not matched with a com-
mensurate commitment by states to the idea of human rights and democracy
protection, then political backlash against the ACtHPR may follow.154 This
backlash could range from (systematic) non-compliance with decisions, to a
broad transnational coalition to dismantle the court.155
Thirdly, conflict dynamics will influence the ability of states to implement
the ACDEG. Higher levels of implementation are expected in stable countries
and post-conflict states. However, the latter groupmay struggle with more cap-
acity challenges as conflicts tend to drain and destroy state resources. At the
same time, post-conflict processes, including transitional governance arrange-
ments, are increasingly fused with international law and politics matched
with assistance programmes with a bias towards democratic state reconstruc-
tion.156 These dynamics could also propel implementation of the ACDEG.
151 Goldstein et al “Introduction”, above at note 74 at 391.
152 M Kahler “Conclusion: The causes of and consequences of legalization” (2000) 54/3
International Organization 661 at 675.
153 For an analysis of the influence of regime types (liberal vs illiberal democracies) on the
implementation of ACDEG, see U Engel “The 2007 African Charter on Democracy,
Elections and Governance: Trying to make sense of late ratification and non-
implementation of compliance mechanisms” (2019) Africa Spectrum (forthcoming).
154 TG Daly and M Wiebusch “The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Mapping
resistance against a young court” (2018) 14/2 International Journal of Law in Context 294.
155 M Madsen, P Cebulak and M Wiebusch “Backlash against international courts:
Explaining the forms and patterns of resistance to international courts” (2018) 14/2
International Journal of Law in Context 197.
156 See E De Groof and M Wiebusch (eds) International Law and Transitional Governance (forth-
coming, Routledge); R Paris “International peacebuilding and the ‘mission civilisatrice’”
(2002) 28/4 Review of International Studies 637.
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In sum, the authors anticipate a great level of variation in the implementa-
tion of the ACDEG across countries, subject areas and actors. No single cause
can ensure its full operationalization. A convergence of several contextual fac-
tors favourable to the implementation of the ACDEG is required to trigger and
maintain it. Charting the contextual factors that shape the ACDEG’s actual
implementation and expanding the framework in this article with, for
example, economic and cultural factors, suggest a fruitful area for further
empirical study.
CONCLUSION
The main aim of this article was to analyse the record of the implementation
of the ACDEG in promoting and protecting democratic governance. In doing
so, it has considered the various (O)AU policy agendas that were consolidated
in the instrument, the various innovations propelled by the ACDEG, as well as
the different challenges encountered in its implementation. The examination
of the charter’s legislative genealogy made clear that it is only one of many
sites featuring the struggle regarding the “Africanization” of domestic govern-
ance arrangements. The historical analysis revealed that many progressive
ideas about how the AU can contribute to strengthening the democratic land-
scape had already been circulating on the continental plane but were, due to
insufficient political support, rejected in favour of more restrained attitudes
towards continental governance. Yet, the article also noted that several ideas
on more robust continental engagement eventually did develop the necessary
momentum. These include coercive human rights enforcement, direct access
to monitor compliance with democratic election standards and a stricter ban
on undemocratic practices.
Overall, the article noted that the African continent is increasingly moving
towards more cooperation in the domain of democracy, elections and human
rights, through legalization, technocratization and judicialization. This is evi-
dent in the growth of AU legal instruments in the domain of democratic gov-
ernance, increased reliance on technical experts instead of political or
diplomatic actors in interpreting and implementing these instruments, as
well as the expanding role of continental and regional judicial bodies in adju-
dicating on these instruments. These processes signal a greater collective com-
mitment to effective democratic governance, rather than the inverse,
notwithstanding the various remaining democratic challenges throughout
the continent and the challenge of ensuring adequate compliance and
enforcement of states’ commitments. These challenges include but are not
limited to: generating sufficient buy-in from member states to ratify the
ACDEG; capacity levels to ensure and monitor democratic governance; and
the limited acceptance of continental human rights enforcement. The AU is
undeniably ambitious in its intention to contribute to the agenda of democ-
ratization in Africa. However, its success will depend on the interplay of a set
of contextual factors, including legal factors, the dynamics between actors
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involved in the implementation of ACDEG, and broader social and political
contexts.
The ACDEG’s past has converged with an emerging global consensus on lib-
eral democracy. It is reasonable to assume that its future will also be contin-
gent on a number of global social, political and economic factors. This
raises the question of whether the African consensus on liberal democracy
will maintain momentum if a global trend continues towards a post-liberal
world order. The rise of China, the inward turn of the United States concur-
rent with its withdrawal as the principal promoter of liberal values, and a fur-
ther ascent of illiberal governments and nationalist movements in Europe
suggest a possible transformation of the international liberal order.
Exploring the degree of convergence with this global trend, or alternatively
divergence through a potential African counter-trend, promises to be a fertile
area for future research.
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